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The Politics of Three Case Studies
Industrialization
Eve S. Weinbaum, Ph.D.
This article analyzes the grassroots efforts of the working and unemployed poor of
three Appalachian communities to improve their towns ' devastated economy in an
era of rapid economic change and globalization. While all three were beset by
plant closings, their forms of political mobilization, both before and after the shut-
down, differed. Each group of workers mounted a communitywide campaign de-
signed to convince the company to stay, to induce local government action, to re-
ceive pay and benefits due, and to influence state legislation and economic devel-
opment policy. Mobilization in the wake of a plant closing is rather extraordinary,
especially in isolated, low-income rural areas. Why did it occur in these communi-
ties, and what were its consequences for the participants and for the state? First,
each group's ultimate failure to influence an economic outcome and policy reveals
the grim prospects for meaningful local democratic politics in a global economy.
But second, the mobilization in two of the three cases succeeded in transforming
the participants and the local community.
There is something new and disturbing about current economic afflictions," says
The New York Times. 1 In the 1990s, journalists and social scientists of all politi-
cal persuasions are observing troubling trends and widespread anxiety regarding eco-
nomic issues, especially among the unemployed and the poor, but increasingly through-
out the American middle class. The changes that accompany downsizing and
deindustrialization are affecting a broad group of workers — from blue-collar produc-
tion workers to high-level managers — in nearly every region of the country.
The changes of the late 1980s and early 1990s in New England have been particu-
larly severe. Partly because of decreases in defense-related spending, the Northeast has
seen what one economist has called "dramatic employment reductions ... the most
severe recession the region has faced since the Great Depression."2 A disproportionate
share of these reductions has been caused by business failures or plant closings in a
variety of economic sectors. Closings in New England, as elsewhere in the nation, have
had serious, undesirable implications for the regional economy. Firms that cease to exist
cannot rehire workers in periods of economic recovery, banks whose business customers
default become less likely to finance new ventures, and communities are decimated as
laid-off workers disperse. Accordingly, economists argue that high rates of plant clos-
ings tend to have lasting repercussions and to slow eventual economic recovery. 3 The
"global economy" has had an obvious and well-documented impact on Americans'
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standard of living and economic expectations, but it also has affected our politics.
I analyze the political changes that accompany deindustrialization in cities and rural
areas all across the United States by closely examining three plant closings in Appala-
chian Tennessee. Although local conditions and regional differences are important,
these communities provide a useful microcosm for the study of political mobilization
around economic change in any region. Many of the firms that once left New England
and the Midwest for the low wages and less stringent regulations of southern regions
like Tennessee are now moving on. Some are going overseas in a continuing quest to
reduce production costs, others are moving between states and counties to benefit from
economic development policies and incentives. Whatever the reason, capital mobility is
becoming more prevalent than ever, leading to serious consequences for every region of
the United States.
All three subject communities analyzed experienced plant closings between 1988
and 1993. The workers in each plant, deciding to protest the shutdown in some way,
undertook an effort to improve their community's devastated economy in an era of rapid
economic change and globalization. Different forms of political mobilization took place
either before the closing (with the hope of preventing it) or afterward, or both. Each
community mounted a communitywide campaign to prevent the plant from closing, to
induce local government action, to acquire the pay and benefits due them, or to lobby
for state or federal legislation. Such mobilization in the wake of a plant closing is rather
extraordinary, and I examine the reasons for its occurrence and its results in all three
cases.
I discuss the mobilization in several stages, the first covering the circumstances of
the shutdowns. It is striking that, although the workers in these plants had more or less
notification and time to prepare, this made little difference; all the closings came as a
shock and a hardship. The three factories are in small towns in rural areas, and the
workers knew that once laid off, finding work, except at fast-food restaurants, cleaning
houses, or through temporary agencies, would not be easy.
The second stage is the mobilization campaign. The nature of the effort varies tre-
mendously between cases. Is the problem framed as a single plant's failure or as a chal-
lenge to the structure of the American economy? Besides the breadth of the issue, there
is the question of the nature of the target of the activity: the plant manager, the corpora-
tion, the local, state, or federal government. I show that these are not given parameters
but the choices of the leaders in the early stages of a campaign.
The third stage involves the nature of the coalition that forms around the issue as it is
framed. To be successful, organizers must recruit others who can provide resources and
examples. Their ability to do this depends on many factors, including the current degree
of organization in the workplace and in the community and between the two, as well as
the leadership and organizing skills of those involved in the drive.
Finally, I argue that the success or failure of each mobilizing effort must not be
judged by economic outcomes alone. When small, rural, economically and politically
marginalized groups confront national and international institutions on the direction of
the global economy, positive material outcomes are a rarity. At least as important are
the changes in the individual participants and in their communities brought about by the
experience of political mobilization. Through this process, participants come to under-
stand many factors in an entirely different light: their own power and the power of col-
lective action; power relations in their communities; their relationship to authority and
the ability to stand up for what is right; the "economy"; national debate of public policy
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issues; politics and the role of elected officials; and their commonality with working
people across the country and the world. I based the description and analysis of the
striking differences in their perceptions of their experiences, and of politics more gener-
ally, on my sixty in-depth interviews, conducted October 1993 through February 1994,
with employees in all three communities. These transformations demonstrate the poten-
tial of grassroots organizing to generate political change.
These cases show that organized and sustained struggle requires many factors, in-
cluding various types of resources, preexisting community networks, and perhaps most
important, leadership. I show that the differences in the types of issues defined, the
campaigns waged, the coalitions formed, and the changes in both understandings and
material conditions are directly related to the type of political organizing that character-
ized each effort.
Case 1: Greenbrier Industries
The more than five hundred Greenbrier Industries employees who returned from their
Fourth of July vacation in the summer of 1993 found a rude surprise awaiting them. The
Clinton, Tennessee, workers were greeted by a telephone message instructing them not
to report to work the following day. Some disregarded the message or, certain it could
not be true, went to the factory to find out more about what was happening. There they
found supervisors and plant managers who were equally confused. The workers were
told only that they would receive word in a week as to when they should come back to
work. When they checked in the following week, they received the same response. No
one knew what to expect, but there was no work. Little by little, the employees discov-
ered the truth: Greenbrier would not reopen. Even worse, it appeared that the company
had for months been secretly siphoning off funds. Most workers' final paychecks had
bounced. Many payroll taxes had not been paid, suppliers had stopped deliveries when
months-old bills were left unpaid, and the company was behind on its obligations. On
July 28, 1993, Greenbrier Industries quietly filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy at its New
Jersey headquarters.
Hiring as many as 650 people, Greenbrier Industries had been the second largest
employer in Clinton, a town of only 8,000. An apparel plant owned by Northerners, it
was a rather typical rural southern factory employing mainly women to sit in front of
assorted sewing machines for long days. The pay was low; in 1994, most new workers
were paid $4.50 an hour. More experienced workers hoped to be placed in piece-rate
jobs in which they could be rewarded for extraordinary speed. But when a worker or a
group became too efficient at a particular task — when their earnings neared $7.00 or
even $8.00 an hour— engineers appeared to conduct new time studies and reevaluate
the piece rate downward. Sewing machine operators did not get rich at Greenbrier, yet
workers maintain that they liked working there. Treated well, they considered them-
selves part of the Greenbrier "family."
The large old brick factory building by the river, just two blocks from City Hall and
in clear view of the Anderson County courthouse, could not have been a more centrally
located landmark. It drew workers from very poor rural Campbell, Union, and Roane
counties, but most of the employees lived nearby, and nearly everyone in Clinton seems
to have had at least one relative, friend, or neighbor who worked at Greenbrier. The
twenty-two-year-old company had a rather checkered past. Plagued by investigations
and allegations of corruption, Greenbrier had been shifted among various interrelated
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owners for many years, yet had continued to grow and thrive. Greenbrier's main
customer— for years it had been the only one — was the U.S. government. The plant,
which was awarded Department of Defense contracts, had started by making body bags,
eventually branching out into parkas, bulletproof vests, camouflage suits, tents, wind-
breakers, and dress coats. The workload had been extremely heavy during Operation
Desert Storm, and managers not only hired many more workers, but everyone put in
overtime hours, sometimes as long as sixteen-hour shifts several days in a row. But
business had slowed so that workers were being shifted around and sometimes laid off.
Everyone seemed to know that business was bad, but management had continued to
assure workers that everything was all right. The sudden bankruptcy was a shock to the
entire Clinton community.
For many workers, the devastation of suddenly being faced with no work and no
income was intensified when they learned the details of the bankruptcy. Many were
burdened by the most serious problem of owing huge hospitalization bills. While they
were employed, the workers had continued to contribute weekly payments — approxi-
mately $30 a week from a gross salary of less than $200 — for health insurance. But
without informing anyone, the company had stopped paying their bills six months pre-
viously. Greenbrier, a self-insured business, had not paid medical bills for half a year.
Some workers owed up to $40,000 in hospital bills, despite the assurance of the com-
pany, to both the workers and the doctors, that it would cover all services, including
major surgery. By the fall, the workers were being hounded by collection agencies on
behalf of hospitals, and some began to receive notices that their wages, if they had any,
would be garnisheed to pay Greenbrier's outstanding bills.
Many workers had also contributed to a 401 (k) pension plan, some up to 15 or 20
percent of their monthly wages, on the promise that their personal contributions were
being matched by those of their employer. After the company declared bankruptcy,
these employees found that not only had there been no matching payments, but their
own contributions had been seized by the bank. Workers watched helplessly as their
livelihood and their entire savings disappeared.
The Greenbrier Workers Committee
When it was clear that the plant was permanently closed, the Greenbrier workers called
a meeting at which almost three hundred people appeared. Comparing notes, they dis-
covered common ground: everyone had been promised that they would return to work
after the summer vacation; nobody's hospital and doctor bills had been paid for at least
six months; no one knew what had become of their 401 (k) savings. One by one, out-
raged workers stood up to tell their stories. The group, becoming increasingly angry,
discussed possible courses of action. Because the company had declared bankruptcy, no
one was optimistic about the plant's reopening. Someone pointed out that although the
workers' bills had not been paid and many of their final paychecks had bounced, the
managers and office staff were still working. So the group decided to begin picketing
twice a week. They demanded that the company dedicate whatever money remained not
to office staff in an empty factory but to repayment of its debts to the workers. The
activists also decided to continue meeting in the county courthouse every Thursday
evening to share information and to make further plans.
Although the decision to picket was spontaneous, it was taken seriously by the at-
tendees. More than one hundred workers, armed with angry picket signs, arrived the
following Saturday morning and led a lively parade in front of the factory. The local
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press showed up, and even the Knoxville newspaper and television stations took notice,
for picket lines are an unusual sight in the quiet Cumberland plateau. Energized by this
attention to their plight, the workers told their stories and attempted to garner even
more notice. They called their senators and representatives and contacted county and
city executives, asking that an official investigation be undertaken. The federal officials'
only response was to refer them to the nearest job training and employment offices, and
the local officials claimed that they had no power to intervene.
When a report of the Greenbrier workers' initial meeting and picket line appeared in
the Knoxville press, the Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network (TIRN) became inter-
ested. A coalition of labor, community, church, and environmental groups dedicated to
organizing around such economic issues as plant closings, TIRN had been involved in
helping workers in similar situations. TIRN sent a staff organizer, Tom Turner, to speak
with the Greenbrier workers to determine whether they would be receptive to his assist-
ing them in planning strategies and educating people about their rights and opportuni-
ties. Turner attended an early meeting, bringing with him two women who had lost their
jobs when their sewing factories closed. They described to the group the hardship of
surviving a plant closing and provided information regarding the various government
programs and what could be expected of each. Following this gathering, Turner contin-
ued to attend Greenbrier meetings and picket lines and began to work more closely with
a group of key leaders. They decided to call themselves the Greenbrier Workers Com-
mittee (GWC), elected officers, and formally joined TIRN.
The picket lines and meetings continued, but as weeks passed the ex-workers became
demoralized. They had succeeded in getting the office staff out of the empty plant, but
were given no answers concerning the money due them. The media ceased to be inter-
ested in the stale plant-closing news, and politicians no longer returned phone calls.
Some of the workers found new jobs, most requiring significant commutes and paying
less than their previous amounts, and most had no time to continue protesting. Others
decided that the situation was hopeless and gave up. By early December, fewer than ten
people attended a Thursday meeting, and it seemed unlikely that the GWC would con-
tinue to exist. The leaders decided to hold one more meeting, in mid-January, to see if
progress had been made in tracking down their 401 (k) and other funds, and to disband
after that.
The Failure of the GWC
At an early meeting the laid-off workers had discussed possible strategies. Understand-
ably, their immediate goal was to secure the money they feared was lost: their final
paychecks, health insurance, and pension savings. Toward this end, Turner suggested
that they contact a lawyer, bringing Rick DeLone, a Knoxville attorney experienced in
bankruptcies to their next meeting. The attorney had spoken with the bankruptcy trustee
in New Jersey to ascertain the status of the Greenbrier estate. After listening to the
workers' concerns and needs, DeLone presented the bad news. If he were in their shoes,
he told them honestly, he would not spend the time and money either suing Greenbrier
or following up on their claims. It would be prohibitively expensive for the workers to
hire him, DeLone said, because it would require repeated trips to the northern New
Jersey company headquarters where all its records and the bankruptcy papers were
filed. And it would be unlikely to pay off, since the bankruptcy was complete, and
Greenbrier's individual owners, who reportedly had fled to South America, were protected
by American incorporation laws.
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Some workers at the meeting resisted DeLone's conclusion. Some wanted to think of
ways of raising money. They were eager to offer proof of management's wrongdoing
and to prosecute the offenders. One woman verbalized the certainty of many concerning
the firm's mismanagement. "They knew, probably two, three, four years ago, that they
were running into financial difficulties. There's no doubt in my mind that in this time
frame, they started taking money and putting it into other companies, changing names,
putting it in their own pockets. They really did. And if I had the time, if I had the
money, I could prove this with Greenbrier. But I just don't have the money." She also
explained that their goal in hiring an attorney would not be to win a large settlement but
simply to see justice done. "It wasn't the money that we wanted. I think we would have
been satisfied with an apology. But we never heard from them. It's just horrendous."4
Another woman described her sense of violation and powerlessness. "When they
claimed bankruptcy, it made me so mad I wanted to die. I said it's like standing on the
courthouse steps being raped, and the police driving by and just waving. You know, they
took our money. And apparently they'd been taking it a long time."5 A man wondered at
the imbalance of justice he suddenly saw: "It's like, you've let them steal everything
you've got, and there's nothing you can do about it. But now if we — if you or I— go
out here and steal something, they'll put us in jail. It's just not . . . it's just not fair."6
Yet this tremendous sense of injustice and anger had no outlet. The workers, unable
to dispute DeLone's conclusions, deferred to his expertise. Certain individuals contin-
ued to look for ways to fight rather than to accept their fate passively. Ann Ritter went
to the Anderson County courthouse to see if she could take out a warrant for the plant
manager's or the owner's arrest, because, as she said, "He's took money out of our
checks and used it for his own." But, as she was told, "He's protected by the bankruptcy
court."7 She persisted, calling news stations and being interviewed repeatedly about the
Greenbrier situation. She called Senator Jim Sasser's office and sent reams of informa-
tion to his aides, but ultimately received no response. Eventually Ritter, who had to take
on three jobs to replace her Greenbrier work, had no more time for protest.
Months later a group of workers reconvened and decided that they should continue to
try to raise awareness about their plight. They were still saddled with huge hospital bills
— one was trying to pay off a $38,000 debt at $5.00 a month, which was all he could
afford. They had received no word about their savings money. They were still outraged
and energetic, but after brainstorming awhile, they could think of no real channels by
which they could hope to effect positive changes. They decided to stage a one-day
picket at the county courthouse, to try one last time to move local officials to take up
their case and at least investigate, or preferably to advocate on behalf of the displaced
workers. By then, only about ten workers showed up on the picket line. There was a
palpable sense that their cause had been lost, and that further actions were unlikely and
probably futile.
The Greenbrier workers were desolate and bitter. Although their work was tedious,
dangerous (injury rates, including carpal tunnel syndrome, nerve damage, severed
fingers, and back injuries, were astronomical) and low-paying, they had been surpris-
ingly content. One worker said, "I thoroughly enjoyed my job. I enjoyed learning. And I
just learned so many things, I just loved it." 8 Nearly all talked about how terribly they
would miss their coworkers, about the close relationships they had formed at work.
To many, the most devastating aspect of being laid off was the extreme disrespect
demonstrated in Greenbrier's actions. As one worker explained, "We knew they was in
trouble. We were not surprised they were going to close. We were just surprised at how
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they treated us. That it was done so dirty."9 Another elaborated:
"I think it wouldn't have bothered any of us near as bad if they had said, 'Hey,
we don't have a job for you anymore, we don't have your 401fkj, we don't have
this . . .' But they didn't say anything. And that's what bothers you so bad. It is
terrible. And it takes a long time to get over that. Because you have the devastation
of being without employment, you know, just the financial aspects of it, you have
no health insurance, but then you have to deal with being treated that way. And that,
for me, has been the hardest part. I'm not over that yet. Because I feel like some-
body that they had no respect for whatsoever. And that has been very difficult for
me." 10
Prior to the closing, most workers had felt extremely loyal to Greenbrier. Bob
Walker, who worked on maintenance and security for eighteen years, described his deep
loyalty to the plant manager.
"He was like a father to me. ... I would have done anything for him, really. I was
always a company person ... I cared about the place and wanted to see it grow. I
had opportunities on top of opportunities to take kickbacks on things and I didn't."
He described being injured several years ago, and his decision not to file a workers'
compensation claim or to ask for sick pay.
"No pay, no workmen's comp, or anything. I wanted to be ... I felt at the time that
it would just hurt the company. Then I had a car wreck with one of their vehicles,
reinjured my back. But I didn't sue or apply for workmen's comp or anything. The
company had enough of that on 'em, so I didn't." 11
Like many other workers, Walker was astonished to learn that the managers did not
have the same respect for him.
When asked to explain why the plant closed, the Greenbrier ex-workers were unani-
mous in their judgment: bad management. Some blamed the plant and personnel man-
agers; other placed the fault on upper management and owners in New Jersey. Some
believed their bosses to have been devious and manipulative; others guessed that they
were merely incompetent and lost money by planning and running the factory poorly.
Every worker believed that the plant was entirely profitable, efficient, and productive,
and that it therefore closed unnecessarily. Most workers personalized their blame, and
expressed their sense of extreme betrayal by the plant managers who had been like
parents to them.
Although Greenbrier Industries survived entirely on government contracts with gov-
ernment inspectors always overseeing every aspect of its production, the workers did
not blame the government for what happened. All they would ask the government to do
differently is to punish the "thieves" — the corporate officials who took their savings
and health premiums without providing the promised benefits. None of those inter-
viewed had ever been involved in political campaigns or issues, and many had never
even voted. For them, the plant closure and their elected officials' inefficacy only rein-
forced their sense of powerlessness and their belief that the political system is ulti-
mately corrupt.
The fired Greenbrier workers were more likely to look within the plant itself for an
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explanation. Many blamed their fellow workers. One supervisor described the high
turnover rates, which compromised both efficiency and product quality. While she
noted that machine operators whose $8.00 or $9.00 an hour rate for piecework had been
decreased to $4.50 an hour, she did not connect this fact to the high turnover. Instead,
she blamed the workers: "People don't take any more pride in their work. They're really
not that ambitious, you know . . . especially young people. I guess they're spoiled, prob-
ably. I think a lot of them are satisfied with welfare and that kind of help." She also
blamed workers for submitting excessive workers' compensation claims, although ac-
knowledging that work-related injuries were rampant, and she had no examples of
fraud. 12 Even after the extreme hardship foisted on them by the company, the workers
often blamed one another for hurting Greenbrier. Even after being forced to apply for
welfare and food stamps, the workers put down people who drew welfare or relied on
any type of government subsidy, seeing themselves as fundamentally "different." Al-
though they were down on their luck, the Greenbrier workers believed that unlike other
recipients of aid, they were more than willing to work.
Case 2: Acme Boot Company
Once upon a time, the Acme Boot Company owned and operated five large boot-mak-
ing plants in Tennessee. It employed thousands of workers in sorting, cutting, stamping,
stitching, piping, and shipping and receiving. Making high-quality casual, dress, and
cowboy boots for such famous labels as Dingo, Dan Post, and Luchessi, Acme was the
largest boot manufacturer in the world. Unlike most factories in rural Tennessee, Acme
Boot was unionized, and employees were well treated and relatively well paid. Workers
describe leaving farms or coal mines to work at Acme, then encouraging their families
and friends to join them. Many attest to the closeness they felt with their fellow workers
and to their pride in the unsurpassed quality of the product they turned out every day.
The company had been in Tennessee for nearly seventy years, and at corporate head-
quarters in Clarksville, Acme was proud to be the county's largest and best-known em-
ployer. People in Clarksville still remember how, during the Great Depression, the com-
pany had sent its workers out to cut the grass every day rather than lay them off.
Beginning in the early 1980s, Acme Boot plants began to shrink or close, as the work
was moved elsewhere. Acme had opened nonunion, lower-wage plants in Texas,
Mexico, and South America, and much of the production was done there, with boots
returning to Tennessee for finishing, repairs, and shipping. By 1990, the Clarksville
plant was the only one remaining, and many laid-off workers had relocated there to
keep their boot-making jobs. In November 1992, the final bomb fell. Acme announced
plans to close the Clarksville manufacturing plant. About six hundred people would be
laid off, most within two months, and production work would shift south, especially to
a new plant in Puerto Rico. The company president announced that some management
and supervisory personnel would move to Puerto Rico immediately to begin operations
there. He reassured the community that although no manufacturing operations would
remain in Clarksville, almost a hundred managerial employees would remain in corpo-
rate headquarters there. "Acme will continue to be in Clarksville . . . Clarksville is
home," he said. 13 The workers saw it differently.
The events leading to this closing had begun several years earlier. In 1985 the com-
pany had been bought out by Farley Industries, a Chicago-based, privately held firm led
by industrialist and high-profile takeover specialist William F. Farley. A diversified
company with interests in automotive components, railroad parts, apparel, and foot-
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wear, Farley Industries is best known for its Fruit of the Loom label. Farley viewed
Acme's reported annual sales of more than $3 billion as a profitable addition to its foot-
wear holdings. The decision to close the Clarksville plant, made in Farley's offices in
Chicago's Sears Tower, was part of a long-term restructuring toward outsourcing, ac-
cording to corporate spokespeople. Acme would move out of manufacturing and into
marketing, buying low-cost boots from makers in Latin America and elsewhere and
selling them under the Acme labels.
For the immediate future, however, production was booming in El Paso — much of
the actual work was done, for much lower wages, across the border in Mexico, where
the two Acme plants had doubled their employee base and tripled production in the
previous year. 14 The Clarksville boot-making operations were being moved to Puerto
Rico. Asked to explain this decision, Acme president Mike Vogel said, "It's better for us
to do it there. It's less costly . . . There are some tax code advantages to doing work in
Puerto Rico." He also cited lower wage and benefit costs and potential employee train-
ing incentives for Acme. He did not say that the Clarksville plant was closing because it
was doing badly. Indeed, 1992 was Acme Boot's second best profit-making year of all
time. 15
The decision to move the plant to Puerto Rico was directly encouraged by both the
Puerto Rican and the U.S. governments. After discussions, Puerto Rican officials gave
Acme Boot a building in Toa Alta owned by the Puerto Rico Industrial Development
Company, a government entity. The building and its surrounding roads and utilities had
been built with federal government money, and had previously been occupied by a phar-
maceutical division of Baxter International Inc. Acme, in return, had promised to invest
$1 million in production equipment and machinery and to hire six hundred workers. The
newspaper Caribbean Business reported, "The establishment of Acme Boot operations
in Puerto Rico is a major boost to the island's footwear and leather goods industry, espe-
cially in light of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which is seen as influenc-
ing labor-intensive industries such as apparel and leather goods to set up plants in
Mexico." 16
This great boon for economic developers in Puerto Rico was an equally great tragedy
for the Clarksville workers. The Acme jobs were not extremely well paid, and the work
was certainly not easy. The highest pay bracket for unionized workers, $7.95 an hour,
was only for those who had been on the job more than thirty years. When the plant
closed, the average employee was forty-eight years old and the average length of senior-
ity was twenty-five years. Most workers had believed their jobs were absolutely secure.
Having worked at Acme for their entire adult lives, they had no experience or training in
anything else. Moreover, Clarksville was in the middle of a serious recession — accord-
ing to most workers a true depression— and they knew other jobs would be scarce and
pay well below Acme's rates. Jobs above minimum wage were nearly impossible to
find.
The Union Fights Back
For about ten years previous to Acme Boot's closing, management had been telling the
union— United Rubber Workers Local 330 (URW) — that times were tough and de-
manded cuts in wage scales and concessions on benefits. Alan Buckner, Local 330's
chief steward at the time, remembers one particularly harsh round of negotiations in the
early 1980s. "We went through negotiations to give concessions to keep the plants open.
I tried at that time to get [the union president] not to do it. I said, 'They're going to
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close the plants anyways.' But cuts and concessions came. I went from piecework to
hourly work. I went from $13.22 an hour to $5.35." 17 With every contract, more pay
cuts were handed down and more hard-won benefits were lost. Managers brought in
cost figures from El Paso and elsewhere and told the employees that to retain the work
in Clarksville they had to be "competitive" and cut their own costs. The workers voted
to go along with the concessions in the hope of saving the factory and their jobs.
When the company announced that the Clarksville plant would close, the union
leadership was surprised and furious. They had seen Acme's other Tennessee plants
close, and had been reassured that the Clarksville factory — Acme Boot's first and
flagship plant— was doing better than ever. Suddenly they were told that within two
months from the announcement, half the employees would be laid off. Even worse,
managers were already being relocated to Puerto Rico to hire 250 workers for the
brand-new Acme Footwear, Inc.
The union immediately challenged the legality of the shutdown, claiming that Acme
Boot officials had violated the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act by not telling the employees who would be laid off when. Federal law requires
companies to give employees sixty days' advance notice of potential layoffs or plant
closings. The Tennessee Department of Labor was given a list of those who were to be
separated in the coming two weeks, but the workers were never advised.
The union then began a publicity campaign, notifying the local press and local offi-
cials of Acme Boot's plans. The union held a very well-attended rally, claiming that
closing the Clarksville plant was possibly illegal and certainly immoral. Individual
workers told their stories and wondered what they would do after losing one of the best
jobs in Clarksville. Forced to respond, company officials assured the public that they
intended to be a "good corporate citizen" of Clarksville, providing more assistance and
notification on the closing than required by law. Focusing on the hundred remaining
employees, Vogel claimed, "The last five or six years have been very tough. What we
are trying to do is make this company well so we have jobs for the remaining employ-
ees."
18 The workers, who had received their highest production bonuses ever, knew
differently. The Clarksville plant's profits were higher than they'd ever been.
Union leadership, who began to research Acme's proposed move to Puerto Rico,
found that the company was taking advantage of the Possessions Tax Credit, also known
as Section 936 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, which allows Puerto Rico subsidiar-
ies to repatriate their profits back to their American corporate parents without federal
taxation. Federal corporate income taxes are waived on profits earned in U.S. territories,
including Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, giving multinational corporations
a legal 100 percent tax break. Also, under the Puerto Rico Tax Incentive Act, an Ameri-
can company is not required to pay the high Puerto Rico income taxes. The company
acknowledged that it was looking forward to the tax breaks.
With the help of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union
(OCAW), which had just been through a similar fight against the Elkhart, Indiana,
Whitehall Pharmaceuticals, the URW learned more about Section 936 and decided to
fight Acme's plans. The strategy was to block the company from taking advantage of
Puerto Rico's tax breaks, relying on a 1987 commonwealth law which said that local
officials can refuse to waive the local corporate taxes if they find that a company's
move caused economic hardships on the mainland. A question on the tax break applica-
tions asks if the jobs in Puerto Rico would cost jobs in the United States. If the answer
is yes, the company is ineligible for tax benefits. Acme's answer, no, was a lie, which
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constitutes tax fraud.
In January the union held a second rally, focusing on Acme's move to Puerto Rico.
Calling Acme a runaway shop, the URW directly blamed Section 936 for Clarksville's
expected loss of 480 jobs in one year. The United Rubber Workers vowed to save Acme
Boot by convincing either the U.S. or the Puerto Rican government to review and deny
the company's claims, an action that had never been taken. The union amassed proof
that equipment was shipped directly from Clarksville to Puerto Rico and that the work
planned for Puerto Rico duplicated part of the Clarksville operation. The union found
support from other organizations, such as the Midwest Center for Labor Research
(MCLR), which identified thirty-five communities from which more than 15,000 jobs
were transferred from mainland plants to Puerto Rico tax-sheltered factories — these
represented only a fraction of the 100,000 people known to be employed in Puerto
Rican factories owned by American corporations. A researcher with the MCLR called
this "a case of tax-loophole-driven job destruction" and agreed with the URW's position
against Acme's petition.
Union leaders traveled to Washington to try to convince the American government to
block Acme Boot's 936 request. There they found themselves up against the Puerto
Rico-USA Foundation, a lobbying group made up of seventy major Fortune 500 corpo-
rations fighting to uphold Section 936 and other incentives. Initiatives by members of
Congress to amend 936, or to require corifirmation that job transfers do not harm main-
land workers, have repeatedly failed. The congressmen cannot compete with aggressive
lobbyists for companies like Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, which saves $156,400 in taxes for
every employee in Puerto Rico, whose earnings average only $26,471. The U.S. Trea-
sury Department estimates that it annually loses about $3 billion in taxes to Section 936
— profits that accrue directly to transnational corporations. 19
Union leaders also initiated contacts with Puerto Rican officials, urging that they
enforce their law prohibiting tax benefits to manufacturing companies whose relocation
on the island is directly responsible for job losses in the States. They found that Acme
had already been received with open arms by local politicians desperate for new jobs at
almost any price. URW president Mitch Tucker wrote to Puerto Rico governor Pedro
Rossello to ask that he deny tax benefits to Acme Boot. He said that the plant scheduled
to open in Toa Alta, Puerto Rico, would be carrying out essentially the same manufac-
turing procedures being performed in Clarksville. "We state to you unequivocally that
this is a runaway shop ... If an exemption has already been granted, you must revoke it
... If an application is now pending, it should be denied." Tucker added that Acme
"plans to perform Clarksville production processes on Clarksville brand name boots
with equipment shipped from Clarksville . . . Any attempt by Acme Footwear, Inc., to
represent the facts otherwise, especially on its application under the Puerto Rico Tax
Incentive Act, would be fraudulent."20 Tucker also sent letters to resident commissioner
Carlos Romero Barcelo and to vice president-elect Albert Gore, neither of whom re-
plied.
Thwarted in its efforts within regular political channels, the URW launched a public
campaign. Its goal was to increase public pressure to persuade the company to continue
manufacturing operations in Clarksville and to abandon its plans to open a boot finish-
ing plant in Puerto Rico. At a rally in Clarksville, Mitch Tucker vowed, "We want to
send William Farley a message. We intend to fight this illegal shutdown." Turner called
on Farley to fulfill his promise, made at the time of purchase, that Acme Boot would
maintain manufacturing in Clarksville. 21 The rally featured Connie Malloy of the
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OCAW, who had helped fight Section 936 in Elkhart, and Ricky Mullins, a dislocated
Decaturville Sportswear worker. The URW repeatedly drew on the parallels between the
Clarksville and Decaturville stories, as the Decaturville plant closing had been a major
campaign issue in 1992 when the company moved from Tennessee to Central America
with the support of the Agency for International Development. Vice President Gore had
visited Decaturville and denounced the pattern it represented, and Ricky Mullins had
been invited to the Faces of Hope luncheon at the Clinton inaugural. Yet when the URW
pointed out the similarity and asked for the Clinton administration's support, it received
no reply.
The union urged all area unions as well as community groups and churches to attend
its rallies, demonstrations, and events and to participate in its campaign. The media,
and some public officials, began to take notice. The San Juan Star quoted Puerto Rico's
new chief of economic development, Clifford Myatt: "If it is a clear case (of a run-
away), then we will be obliged to make a decision in accordance with the facts." But
Myatt also cautioned that while his agency would take a close look at the Acme appli-
cation, there is "a very thin fine" between runaways and normal plant closings. "We
will have to see the reasons for the closing, whether the company thinks it makes busi-
ness sense, and if it does not relocate in Puerto Rico, if it intends to relocate somewhere
else." And a spokeswoman for vice president-elect Al Gore said Acme's proposed move
was "an unfortunate use of the existing tax law, which was intended to create jobs."22
With other groups from Clarksville and elsewhere in Tennessee and the nation, the
Acme workers planned event after event. They held demonstrations, press conferences,
and marches. Supported by the Clarksville community, they held a three-hundred-car
motorcade through the small downtown. Every weekend, workers stood in front of
K-Mart and Winn-Dixie, distributing flyers that explained Section 936 and their plight
and encouraging community members to contact all relevant decision makers. In April
the union sponsored a mass public boot-burning, at which hundreds of Clarksville resi-
dents burned their Acme-made boots. This dramatic gesture inaugurated a national
boycott of Acme, Dingo, and Dan Post boots. A boycott flier, "The Anatomy of an
Acme Boot," designed by award-winning labor cartoonist Mike Konopaki, was distrib-
uted by labor unions nationwide.
On May 29, 1993, the Walter Cronkite Report covered the shutdown of the
Clarksville plant. Invited by the URW, the Report staff attended the boot-burning and
other events, including the last day of work at Acme Boot on May 21. The Cronkite
Report aired extensive footage of interviews with dislocated employees and showed the
devastating impact of job loss on workers in the already depressed Clarksville economy.
It emphasized job flight, the lure of Section 936, and the connection between tax policy
and job loss. Following the Cronkite Report, other national and local news media
picked up the Acme Boot story. Members of Local 330, who received mail and support
from individuals and groups around the country, were tremendously encouraged by the
outpouring of public support for their cause.
At the end of May, Acme suddenly announced that it would not seek federal income
tax exemptions on profits from the Puerto Rico plant. The company withdrew its appli-
cation for Section 936 benefits. Acme president MikeVogel explained that although the
company was distancing itself from the 936 issue, it would still receive local incentives
and was still moving. He claimed that the Clarksville plant closing and the establish-
ment of a new plant in Puerto Rico were "nonrelated, coincidental issues."23 A high-
ranking Puerto Rican official cited "corporate exhaustion" as the reason for Acme's
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withdrawal of its tax exemption application. And Clifford Myatt said, "I think the union
has been so vociferous and unfair in its attack on them that [Acme doesn't] want any
more bad P.R. Also, they've been inundated with so much paperwork and expenses that
they decided to forget it."24
This was a major victory for the workers' campaign against Acme. Yet they had not
succeeded in saving their jobs or their community. The Clarksville plant closed on
schedule, and the company, without benefit of tax breaks, moved its operations to
Puerto Rico. After months of mobilization, coalition building, public education, media
attention, political lobbying, and protest, the Clarksville community lost Acme Boot.
Lessons from the United Rubber Workers Fight
The most obvious and significant difference between the situations at Greenbrier and
Acme Boot was the presence of a strong union. First, because the URW was regularly
negotiating contracts with the company, it had access to financial reports and other
information and could see the coming changes before anything drastic happened. Sec-
ond, because the union had an organizing structure in place, workers could be informed
almost immediately as events unfolded. They were therefore less likely to blame one
another and were kept up to date on the situation. Third, the union had connections to
larger organizations, especially to the URW International Union, other labor unions,
coalitions like Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network, and research and advocacy insti-
tutes like the MCLR. All these provided crucial support at various stages of the work-
ers' mobilization and lobbying. Fourth, the union knew how to launch a public cam-
paign. It, and other unions, unlike the Greenbrier workers, had held marches, parades,
rallies, boycotts, and other events previously and knew how to organize actions success-
fully. They had dealt with the press regularly. Union leaders and members had been
active in political campaigns, so they knew which officials to call first. Finally, the
URW had access to resources from outside the Clarksville community. They could pay
people to fly in for rallies; send representatives to Washington to lobby; create leaflets,
posters, and banners; and buy advertising space in local newspapers. By contrast, the
Greenbrier workers could not even communicate with the bankruptcy trustee because
they could not afford a long-distance phone call to New Jersey.
Interestingly, despite all these benefits Acme's workers were not more pro-union
than Greenbrier's. A few blamed the union for giving away too much or for not doing
more to prevent the closure, but most were absolutely indifferent on the subject of
unions. Although they were not ideologically committed to unions, they appreciated the
benefits and work environment created by a union. Sally Kellam was typical; referring
to her search for a new job, she said, "I don't care one way or the other; it don't matter
to me if it's union or non-union." On the other hand, she noticed real differences be-
tween the two types of plants, and she did have a preference. "I just don't like the way
that things are just different [at nonunion plants]." Her most serious complaints at her
new job involved layoffs, which were random or involved favoritism, mandatory over-
time, and unequal treatment of workers. 25 With the union at Acme Boot, workers had
come to expect fair treatment, open and agreed-upon procedures, and reliable avenues
for redress of grievances. This general expectation of fair treatment seems to have fu-
eled the campaign against Section 936 as well.
Although the Acme Boot campaign failed in its immediate goal, it had a striking
impact on both participants and other members of the community. Ironically, while
unions are usually charged with creating antagonism between workers and management,
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just the opposite can be demonstrated here. Unlike the Greenbrier workers, no Acme
Boot employees blamed their supervisors or managers. Instead, they blamed the federal
government for maintaining the Section 936 tax loophole and helping major corpora-
tions rather than workers of either country. The workforce was effectively educated to
understand the national and international political decisions that led to the plant clos-
ing. They understood Acme's move as a strategic decision encouraged by a series of
governmental decisions made under pressure from large transnational corporations.
When other economic issues arose, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement,
they could understand them in this same context. While most of the Greenbrier workers
who had opinions said they believed NAFTA would probably be "a good thing," all the
Acme Boot workers interviewed could speak quite knowledgeably about the agreement
and its effects on both American and Mexican workers.
The Acme personnel were better educated about American politics as well. They had
participated in letter-writing campaigns, met with politicians, and learned a great deal
about the political process. They were not, however, necessarily more sanguine about
the political system. Sally Kellam expressed a common sentiment: "We [the URW
workers] went out here and worked for [President Clinton] to get him in office. Now we
feel like we've been let down. So, I don't think I'm gonna vote again. What's the point?
. . . Now, maybe I'll change when the time comes again."
But whether or not she participates in electoral politics, Kellam was changed by the
Acme Boot campaign: "I've gotten more involved in a lot of things since this plant
closing . . . I've gotten more involved. I have never in my life wrote letters to congress-
men and the White House; I never was like this . . . But I feel like we need to stand up
because that's important. They need to know how the people feel. It could make a
change. It could make a difference."26
Case 3: General Electric
In Morristown, a midsize town in the mountainous, rural Appalachian region, a job at
General Electric had been considered one of the best positions a person could hold.
Morristown has a low rate of unionization and, like all of upper East Tennessee,
Hamblen County has been hard hit by plant closings and layoffs. In 1988, GE was con-
sidered a progressive employer and an invaluable asset to the community, with wage
scales higher than those of most local industrial facilities. Most workers earned between
$9.00 and $12.00 an hour, had been there for many years, and considered that they had
secure, permanent jobs. Yet a new management team had begun to institute changes that
seemed to alter the character of the plant and labor-management relations for the worse.
The workers felt increasingly harassed and powerless.
In June of that year, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)
launched a union organizing campaign at GE's Morristown plant. There was great ini-
tial support among workers, but the company spared no expense to counter the union
campaign. Management treated employees to parties and gifts. Workers were shown
films describing how the union would hurt them and the plant. The company produced
its own videocassette devoted to "the GE family," complete with shots of nearly every
worker, some with families and friends, and the beautiful surrounding area. For the
video, the company commissioned an original country music song dedicated to the
people and countryside of Morristown. It promised that GE would protect its workers
and their community more than any "outside" union could.
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By September of 1988, by instilling a mixture of fear and complacency, the company
had won the struggle, and the union was voted down by a 3-to- 1 margin. One observer
noted that "the employees beamed with pride because they thought this would demon-
strate to the company how they believed in General Electric."27
One week after the vote, GE laid off more than one hundred of those same workers.
They were told that they would be recalled to work in the spring of 1989. But the next
week they learned from radio, television, and newspapers that their jobs were perma-
nently lost. The distribution center warehouse was moving thirty miles away, literally
down the road, to the town of Mascot in adjacent Knox County. GE had received eco-
nomic development incentives from Knox County to encourage the move, as well as
state funding to train new workers. At the new site, GE announced, all work would be
subcontracted through USCO, an independent company, and all jobs would be rede-
fined as "temporary," even though the work was no different than it had been. The pay
would be about $6.00 an hour, with no benefits, a far cry from the union wages the
workers had once anticipated. Knox County executive Dwight Kessell commended the
county's director of economic development for "the extraordinary work she did in se-
curing this new industry and these new jobs for Knox County."28
After hearing about the new plans, the laid-off workers attempted to contact manag-
ers to see if there was any alternative. They met as a group to discuss possible courses
of action. Their offers to freeze or cut their own wages in order to keep their jobs, ben-
efits, and seniority were refused. Attempting to initiate negotiations to retain their jobs,
they were again refused. The company stated that, in order to remain competitive in the
global market, tough measures were necessary. After giving up on changing manage-
ment's mind, some workers simply traveled to the USCO plant, asking to be hired there
— to do their own jobs, for half the pay and no benefits. They were never called back.
By the end of 1989, the hundred permanently laid-off workers were looking for new
jobs. The official listings at the Tennessee Department of Employment Security Job
Service comprised very few openings, and hardly any above minimum wage. Officials
referred worker after worker to temporary service and contract-labor agencies. Unlike
traditional employers, these agencies were continually hiring. Morristown-area facto-
ries were increasingly choosing to contract out for "temporary" employees rather than
hire their own permanent workers.
The Birth of CATS
Having lost good jobs at General Electric, the workers were shocked to hear that tempo-
rary service was their only option. Many had to support families and could not rely on
jobs with absolutely no security or stability, at such low pay and— most important for
some — with no health insurance or pension benefits. They were shocked, too, to find
that they were not alone; permanent, decent-paying jobs in Morristown were systemati-
cally being replaced by temporary jobs, either through agencies or through in-house
temporary labor pools at large companies. The outraged workers, mostly women, began
to meet regularly. At one meeting, someone — no one can now remember exactly who
— suggested they call their group Citizens Against Temporary Services, or CATS, and
the name stuck.
One of their plans was to hire an attorney who would file a lawsuit against GE.
Charging age discrimination, since older workers had been disproportionately singled
out for layoffs, and fraudulent use of government funds, they compiled evidence for a
case against GE. Although they believed their case was strong, the initial hearings
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dragged on, and it became apparent that, if they could win at all, the legal route would
not further their goals in a timely fashion. Eventually, under pressure from GE manage-
ment, their lawyer withdrew from the case and they were forced to drop the suit without
winning anything.
Initially optimistic that aid would be forthcoming once the facts of their case were
public, they began to contact politicians and community leaders to see if anything could
be done. When they met with only apathy or outright hostility from officials, CATS
decided to plan community meetings to put pressure on GE but also to expose their
larger concerns about the increasing use and abuse of temporary and contingent workers
by large companies. CATS set out to generate support and to exert pressure to get their
jobs back, but also to look for ways to address issues of injustice in the workplace that
were affecting workers in Hamblen County.
With a little research, CATS leaders quickly discovered that the loss of permanent
jobs to the instability and inequities of temporary jobs was a national trend. In fact, the
growth of part-time, seasonal, and other forms of contingent work represents a sea
change in the American workplace. In 1989 the National Planning Association esti-
mated that nearly one third of the entire workforce was composed of contingent work-
ers, and that the percentage was growing. Perhaps unsurprisingly, women and minorities
are disproportionately represented in the temporary workforce — nearly double their
percentages in the total workforce. 29 Between 1983 and 1993, the number of temporary
workers increased by more than 300 percent. 30 The payroll of temporary employment
services— one part of the contingent work boom — increased by almost 3000 percent
between 1970 and 1992. 31 By 1994, Manpower, Inc. — a temporary help supply service
— was the largest employer in the United States, with nearly one million employees.
As CATS began to seek help elsewhere and to devise plans, they found many local
groups and individuals who had similar concerns. They talked with unionized and unor-
ganized workers, and with community groups, politicians, and unemployed people.
Workers from all industries were aware of the problem and troubled by the trend toward
contingent work. On the one hand there was a broad concern and support for reform; on
the other hand, there was very little precedent for positive change. CATS found that
because temporary service agencies in Tennessee were completely unregulated, there
was no official route through which to address abuses. At a legislative meeting in late
1989, the administrator of Tennessee's Personnel Recruiting Service Board, which li-
censes permanent employment placement agencies, said she receives about ten com-
plaints per year about permanent employment agencies, but she gets three complaints
per week about temporary agencies, over which she has no jurisdiction.
After organizing in the fall of 1989, CATS proved extremely persistent and deter-
mined. Wearing their self-made, bright red T-shirts emblazoned CITIZENS AGAINST
TEMPORARY SERVICES across the back, they were highly visible around town. One
of their initial events was a community meeting in Morristown to publicize their plight
and the issue of temporary jobs. Nearly four hundred people attended — a record for
the small town. Shortly thereafter, CATS marched down the streets of Morristown call-
ing for fair labor laws in Tennessee. Hundreds of people attended the parade, which was
spirited yet serious in its demands for attention and reform.
These events, and the remarkable turnout they generated, were all the more impres-
sive because the only Morristown newspaper refused to carry any stories about CATS.
The city and county governments, the Chamber of Commerce, the local business com-
munity, and the local media either actively opposed CATS — as antagonistic to corpo-
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rate interests and therefore harmful to Hamblen County's "business climate" — or dis-
missed it as irrelevant. After being blacked out by the town's one paper, CATS had to
find other strategies to publicize its message and events. One way involved organizing
members and their families to distribute leaflets advertising events at supermarkets and
other public places. Another was to buy space in the Smoky Mountain Trader, a small,
free advertising weekly that was available all over town. In it, CATS publicized its
meetings and other activities, even publishing short articles. This proved most effective,
as the Trader's wide circulation made it a useful conduit of information.
If CATS's public events did not draw mainstream media, they did serve another cru-
cial function: attracting the attention of important potential allies. One of the marchers
at the April parade was Bill Troy, a staff member of the Committee on Religion in Ap-
palachia (CORA), a coalition of church groups working on issues of economic justice.
Troy was in the process of founding a new organization, the Tennessee Industrial Re-
newal Network (TIRN), a coalition of labor, community, and environmental groups to
work on economic issues statewide. Having learned about the CATS march through
friends at the Highlander Center for Research and Education, another Appalachian
institution interested in economic justice, Troy was inspired by CATS members. He
immediately got in touch with the group and remained involved for the next five years.
He invited CATS representatives to a June 1990 Chattanooga conference he was orga-
nizing for June 1990, "Responding to Plant Closings in Tennessee." CATS members
attended the conference, speaking movingly about their experiences with the GE ware-
house closing and its aftermath. This was the beginning of a close alliance with TIRN,
which set up an ongoing committee to assist CATS efforts with staff support and other
resources.
Through their contacts with Highlander Center staff, CATS became aware of an
Appalachian citizens group, Save Our Cumberland Mountains (SOCM). It had worked
primarily on environmental and land use problems for many years, but had recently
become more involved with economic and job issues as well. In 1990, CATS voted to
become the Morristown chapter of SOCM, thereby taking advantage of the group's
extensive experience in organizing, strategizing, and lobbying skills and resources. This
alliance was a further means of institutionalizing CATS and ensuring a strong base from
which it could continue its work.
With the help of SOCM staff, CATS began to design a strategy to push for govern-
ment action. Ferreting out the facts of the government's complicity in GE's move
proved difficult. CATS leaders made hundreds of frustrating phone calls to Nashville
and Washington, to every imaginable relevant office. A few traveled to Nashville sev-
eral times to ask questions in person. After nine months of research, they finally discov-
ered that tax dollars had indeed been allocated to GE to support its move to Mascot.
They tracked down the contract showing that GE had been promised $200,000 in Job
Training Partnership Act (JTRA) funds to train new workers for the exact jobs from
which they had been fired. CATS argued that this was illegal, because JTPA funds can-
not be used for jobs from which fully capable workers had been laid off. GE argued that
it was legal because the new factory was operated by USCO, the labor contractor, rather
than by GE. After putting pressure on Knox County officials and state and federal labor
department officials, CATS won. It was able to prove that GE was directly responsible
for the warehouse and that the fully capable Morristown workers had not been offered
the new jobs although many would have been willing to take them. CATS finally
persuaded the Department of Labor to declare the GE/USCO warehouse in Mascot
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ineligible for JTPA funding and withdraw the $200,000.
Toward the end of 1989, CATS began to push their state legislators to set up a study
committee to look at the issue of temporary services. They also lobbied for a study
committee on fair labor laws in Tennessee. Both committees were set up, and CATS
then demanded that they hold hearings in Morristown. Finally a joint hearing was
scheduled for October at Walter State Community College. CATS once again distrib-
uted leaflets, wrote articles for the Trader, activated their telephone tree, and contacted
labor unions, community groups, churches, and anyone else they could think of. Their
efforts paid off, as an unexpected seven hundred people showed up to overwhelm the
legislators. Many testified movingly about the experiences they had undergone and their
worries for the future of their families and children with all the changes in the work-
place. CATS members were surprised and heartened by the outpouring of support for
them and their issues from all over East Tennessee. They heard horrible stories similar
to theirs from friends and allies they never knew they had. Everyone seemed to agree
that the situation for factory workers was dire and becoming worse, and that it was the
government's responsibility to take action. The committee listened dutifully, but, as
usual with study committees, no results materialized.
CATS finally decided that if Tennessee were to have any type of fair labor laws, the
members themselves would have to create them. In 1990 they wrote legislation that
would define temporary employees as temporary, regulate temporary agencies, and
forbid the replacement of permanent workers with temporary ones. This was precedent-
setting legislation, since at that time no state or local legislation dealt with the abuse of
temporary services. With help from TIRN and SOCM, CATS members pressed for their
bill to be introduced in the 1990 legislative session. As the date for the vote approached,
they organized a delegation of about fifty citizens to drive four hours to Nashville to
lobby for themselves. Although CATS had done extensive lobbying ahead of time, when
they arrived in Nashville for the vote, they found themselves outnumbered and over-
powered by opponents. Federal Express, Eastman Kodak, and other major Tennessee
employers were pushing hard against the CATS bill. The National Association of Tem-
porary Services and its Tennessee affiliate were also lobbying against it. Although
CATS had received promises of support from a majority of committee members, several
decided not to vote at all, and the bill never made it out of committee. The following
year CATS presented a more streamlined, less ambitious bill, for which they again
lobbied extensively. They believed they had a good chance of winning, but they were
outmaneuvered by more politically powerful opponents. After two years of legislative
work, their only tangible result was a bill requiring temporary service agencies to regis-
ter with the state, a minimal requirement that contained no provisions for regulation or
enforcement.
CATS's Ongoing Legacy
CATS failed to accomplish any of its original goals. It did not succeed in keeping the
GE jobs in Morristown; it did not get even one worker rehired. After investing consider-
able sums in attorneys' fees, CATS members lost their lawsuit against General Electric.
The time and energy spent lobbying elected representatives did not generate even a
minimal bill to protect temporary workers. The temporary service industry is subject to
no more regulation than previously, and temporary jobs are still multiplying in
Morristown as permanent ones disappear. Yet despite these failures, CATS is an excel-
lent example of a successful organizing effort. Members of CATS were involved in a
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sustained effort at social change around economic issues. Both the individual partici-
pants and the larger Morristown community — arguably even the entire state of Tennes-
see — were transformed by the struggles begun by a small group of women laid off
from GE.
CATS scored several points that cause it to stand out among community mobiliza-
tions around economic issues. One is symbolized by the name of the group. Unlike the
two companies described above, the Morristown laid-off workers did not organize sim-
ply around the events at GE. They did not call themselves the GE Workers Committee,
or Morristown Citizens Against GE. From the outset they were Citizens Against Tempo-
rary Services, representing a conscious decision to focus on the cause of their problem
rather than its symptom. Moreover, because of its close alliance with larger organiza-
tions in East Tennessee, and because of the region's rich history of community organiz-
ing struggles, CATS was immediately encouraged to foster an understanding of its
members' experiences within a wider context. This association with similar yet diverse
groups had many consequences.
First and probably most important was the contribution of organizing expertise. Bill
Troy of CORA and Susan Williams of the Highlander Center worked closely with the
CATS group, helping them strategize, build a local coalition, plan events, and carry out
an entire campaign. The CATS activists credit Troy and Williams with inspiring them,
helping them think through their ideas, planning next steps after disappointments, and
keeping them going when they felt like giving up. The chairperson of CATS calls them
a lifeline, saying that she would not have survived without their aid.
Second, other organizations provided people to participate in CATS events and to
publicize their issues and struggles. CATS members spoke to a national audience at the
TIRN founding conference in Chattanooga and to statewide audiences at rallies in
Knoxville and Memphis. They joined TIRN leaders to speak with other displaced work-
ers about practical issues like JTPA and other programs, but also about the changes that
are required to better serve the needs of working people. Some even attended a confer-
ence in Washington, D.C., about women in the changing workplace.
Third, other organizations provided essential training in leadership skills. CATS
members participated in workshops at the Highlander Center with community activists
and organizers from all over the South and Appalachia, learning how similar struggles
were handled in similar communities. They were encouraged to speak publicly, to per-
suade others to get involved, to confront decision makers, all entirely new experiences
for the women involved.
Fourth, CATS members were exposed to communities extremely different from their
own. The most dramatic example was a trip to the maquiladora (free trade) zone in
Mexico, sponsored by TIRN. Two CATS leaders participated in the trip, along with
eight other women workers from East Tennessee. They visited a General Electric plant,
among others, and were horrified by the living and working conditions provided by
American corporations. They learned to make connections between their own experi-
ences and those of Mexican women working in the maquiladoras for very low wages,
with no job security or organizing rights. Simply by traveling around Tennessee and
meeting with other groups in the context of their fight for fair labor laws, CATS mem-
bers were educated about changes in the economy and their effects on all kinds of
groups.
Finally, even more intensely than the Acme Boot workers, the CATS participants
underwent a political education and transformation. Until 1988 they had been very
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lucky, holding some of the best, most secure, and highest-paying jobs in Hamblen
County. Through a sudden management decision they became not just laid-off factory
workers but, even worse, workers qualified only for the most unstable, poorest-paying
temporary service positions. This changed their view not only of themselves but of
others as well. Kathy Muller, a CATS leader, described the changes she saw in herself:
I must have been a shallow person. Because, see, I was in my own world. I got up
every day, and I went to work, and I made good money, and . . . when I went to the
grocery store and I saw somebody that had food stamps, I always thought, "Oh, that
little kind of people, they ought to get a job and go to work . . ." Now I'm grateful
that I'm able to look and see and have compassion for people, because they're
having a hard time. I wrote Al Gore a letter and told him that I fully believe that 98
percent of our society would work, if they could make a decent wage to where they
can survive ... I really think if you give people the incentive that they'll work.32
In addition to their attitudes, their political behavior changed as they organized
CATS. Not one member had ever been to the state capitol in Nashville, and very few
had ever so much as written a letter to a public official. As Muller said, "When I
worked at GE I would've never asked my government a question. I would've never
challenged them on anything. Now I challenge them on everything. I mean, I wouldn't
take their word for nothing ... I can see beyond what they say." This was a major
change for Muller. "I had all these ideas that there was justice in the Labor Department.
Even when I lost my job, I thought, Well, not to worry, I'll go out and find another job,
and then when reality started setting in I thought, Well, our government won't let GE do
this. And when you realize they will let 'em do it, they're doing it every day, then I
began to ask questions."33
The process of beginning to ask questions and doubting long-held beliefs about au-
thority was extremely difficult for many. Joe Perkinson, a veteran of the Korean and
Vietnam wars, who was fifty years old when he was laid off, seriously contemplated
suicide and other types of violence. He threatened to bring in a gun to force GE manag-
ers to give him his job back, at whatever wage. Others in the group convinced him to
use more peaceful means. He now has a minimum-wage, temporary job as a security
guard at the Morristown mall. He says he understands why the crime rate is so high in
areas where there are no good jobs.34 Kathy Muller points out that none of the CATS
members had ever fought for something like this before. "I was the type of person, I
guess that if [GE] had told me to go out in a lake and jump in, I would've went in, be-
cause I thought they knew what was best for me ... I had been brought up to think that
if you got a job you did the very best you could, you worked as hard as you could, you
did what they said, because they were boss, and you'd be okay! When I realized that
didn't work, it was hard, it was really hard."35
These hard-learned lessons stuck. More than anyone in Greenbrier or Acme Boot, the
members of CATS continued to participate in political activities. CATS became the
Hamblen County chapter of SOCM, and Muller became a leader in a new campaign to
get city drinking water for people living in a neighborhood near a polluted landfill.
Other members, including several who were previously virulently antiunion, led and
worked in union campaigns. All the members interviewed were extremely knowledge-
able about NAFTA, welfare reform, labor law reform, and other national economic
issues. They continued to write letters and meet with legislators at every opportunity.
Most important, they have learned to stand up for themselves, both individually and
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collectively. Each one can tell stories of confronting authorities, at work and elsewhere,
when injustice was being done. These small demonstrations of resistance, taken to-
gether, have had an impact on many lives.
CATS also transformed Morristown. Anyone in that town who has a problem in the
workplace knows to contact a CATS leader. A small group of them now serve as infor-
mal job counselors for nearly the entire city's population. Moreover, although it has
become SOCM and has quieted down during the past four years, public officials in
Morristown remember CATS. The county executive and Chamber of Commerce offi-
cials refer to it as having instituted the strongest protest about jobs and the economy
Hamblen County has ever seen. Although CATS may have lost the immediate battle, its
legacy can be detected in the ongoing decisions made by local officials who have
known the group's organized power and will always, even unconsciously, anticipate
their reactions.
* * *
The most striking conclusion to be drawn from the three cases of mobilization
in East Tennessee is the exceptional potential of ordinary working people to take on a
complicated issue, educate themselves, fight for what they deserve, and join with others
in a common struggle. The crucial corollary is that in order for this process to take
place, enormous resources are necessary. This is true not in the sense of a traditional
"resource mobilization"36 framework, but in terms of indigenous resources from within
a community: an institutionalized base with which groups can affiliate and learn orga-
nizing skills, sources of publicity and information, and leadership.
These three examples show that abundant crises in every community can serve as
sources of mobilization and protest, but their consequences are more difficult to predict.
In all three companies, the consequence the participants sought— to keep their jobs —
eluded them. The global economy brings a widening gap in power that has proved to be
too severe for impoverished local groups to overcome. Only few such campaigns will
ever produce concrete improvements in economic circumstances, by keeping a plant
from moving on or by pressuring local governmental entities to strengthen their eco-
nomic development bids. Yet even if material benefits never appear, these organizing
efforts are not failures. Where grassroots mobilization has occurred, people have a
much stronger comprehension of fundamental political issues and, as important, a trans-
formed understanding of themselves in relation to those issues. Organizing is likely to
increase political participation and thus strengthen local democracy, educate citizens on
local and national issues, nourish leadership, and foster solidarity and collective respon-
sibility. Different types of mobilization lead to different sets of experiences, understand-
ings, and resulting political behaviors among participants.
Studying political mobilization among low-income rural people reveals the incen-
tives and barriers to true local democracy in an increasingly global economy. This study
has focused on the concern most central to poor people's lives: their jobs and, more
generally, the condition of the local economy. It shows, first, that the most devastating
economic changes result not from an invisible hand within an optimizing free market,
but from sets of national, state, and local institutions and political decisions. It then
shows that local people can have an impact on these issues, although they must contend
with formidable structures and opponents. Although local organizing cannot compete
with the forces shaping national and global economic policy, it can transform local
politics and is an essential beginning. It is important to note that these local battles are
indeed only a beginning.38
The histories presented here prove that in no way should this type of organizing be
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seen as limited to local groups and traditional neighborhood issues. In every case,
people were more than capable of seeing their struggles in a national and international
context and learning to analyze their own towns' economies in this framework. The
transformation from the personal and local to the global remains the test of successful
organizing. Small, disadvantaged communities always encounter difficulty in mobiliz-
ing around economic issues, but if they neglect to act, they are excluded from the deci-
sions that most affect their lives. Examining systems that enable excluded groups to
achieve a voice in such judgments is central to debates about democracy and power in
contemporary American politics and public policy. In an era of downsizing, deindus-
trialization, and economic globalization, these questions are more important than ever. $*
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